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Ab s t r A c t
The author of the paper analyzes John Milton’s great epic narrative through 
the lenses of Paul Ricoeur’s biblical hermeneutics and his philosophical re-
flection, in particular the second chapter of the philosopher’s last book, 
Parcours de la Reconnaissance (The Course of Recognition), devoted mainly 
to the prospects and pitfalls of recognizing oneself. Two excerpts from St. 
Paul’s Letter to Romans (14:23b) and the Letter to Corinthians (1, 13:12) 
highlight the main points of reference in this argument: (1) the concept of 
involuntary wrongdoing and (2) the contrast between the present opacity 
and the projected transparency of the knowing subject, connected with 
the promise of seeing face-to-face, whose fulfilment is rooted in God’s 
antecedent knowledge of a human being. It is argued that Ricoeur’s focus 
on the precarious fate of the “fallible man” and his simultaneous desire to 
outline the destiny of the “capable man” elucidate Milton’s masterpiece 
evocations of the Aristotelian anagnorisis in Paradise Lost.
Ab s t r A c t




TThe witty title of Stanley Kubrick’s film reminds us of the manifold para-doxes involved in the process of self-recognition which are presented in great works of world literature. The tragic hero is often forced to see in retrospect his own errors through the gaping wounds of the “eyes wide 
shut”: from the eyeless Oedipus to blind Gloucester in The Tragedy of 
King Lear. Moreover, Kubrick’s joke bears an oblique trace of yet another 
great narrative of Western culture which begins with the seductive pros-
pect of infinite knowledge (“your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be 
like gods”), culminates with the eating of the forbidden fruit, and ends 
with the painfully exact, but at the same time most unwelcome fulfilment 
of the devil’s equivocation: “And the eyes of them both were opened, and 
they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig trees together, and 
made themselves aprons” (Genesis 3:5, 7). As we all know, the biblical 
myth of the Fall provided the canvas of John Milton’s great epic poem 
about “man’s first disobedience”; and, like the anonymous author of the 
biblical narrative, Milton shows that sin hinders the moment of self-recog-
nition and leads the First Couple into the thicket of self-deceit. Does that 
mean, however, that Milton’s sinners and sufferers must put up with this 
impaired vision of themselves until death definitively “shuts wide” their 
already sightless eyes? This question will inform our reading of the poem 
viewed from the perspective of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical reflection and 
his biblical hermeneutics.
Seeking to disentangle the lacunas of anagnorisis in Paradise Lost, we 
ought to invoke two famous Pauline assertions concerning the problem of 
human guilt and the concomitant issue of the accessibility of self-knowl-
edge, which allows the human agent to assume responsibility for his/her 
deeds (not only wilful transgressions, but also fatal mistakes). As we shall 
soon find out, these assertions are crucial both for the readers of Milton’s 
Christian epic and the addressees of Paul Ricoeur’s last major book, enti-
tled Parcours de la Reconnaissance (The Course of Recognition). Since guilt 
comes first in the order of biblical narrative (Genesis 3), let us start with 
St. Paul’s definition of sin—which, as we all know, in the Greek of the 
New Testament is called by the same name which Aristotle had used way 
before St. Paul to describe the predicament of tragic guilt: hamartia. In the 
Letter to Romans 14:23b we read that “whatever . . . is not of faith, sin is” 
(14:23b). In the Greek original this warning reads: pan de ho ouk ek piste-
os, hamartia estin (Bible Hub). If then, as Ricoeur reminds us, the Greek 
playwrights already recognized the fact that even unwilled actions have 
a bearing on the future, since in their course reality is re-shaped by the 
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protagonist in such a way that s/he cannot return to primordial  innocence, 
it is only in the letter of St. Paul that we are confronted with further impli-
cations of the concept of involuntary wrongdoing. The Pauline definition, 
we could say, offers a pointed retort to all the self-acquitting protests of 
Greek tragic heroes who, as Ricoeur accurately observes, strive to distin-
guish between acts done willingly, in accordance with oneself—hekon—
and deeds committed against oneself, unwillingly—akon (Course 91). This 
is precisely where St. Paul enters the stage with his definition of guilt. Our 
understanding of the notion of hamartia, he seems to imply, cannot be 
separated from what we mean by pistis, which denotes not only “faith,” but 
also “inner conviction,” “self-assurance,” in other words, the very core of 
our “self.” In other words, St. Paul seems to imply that all acts performed 
unwillingly, against one’s true self, must be deemed sinful. The argument 
that the ancient Greek heroes used in self-defence now turns against them, 
as self-ignorance and especially deliberate self-deceit are not just the main 
reason for, but the very essence of, sin.1
On the other hand, though, St. Paul knows only too well that that full 
self-awareness (apparently a necessary prerequisite for upright behaviour) 
is an unattainable ideal in this life. This allowance is expressed in the wide-
ly-known passage from 1 Corinthians: “We see indeed presently through 
a glass in obscurity, then moreover face to face; presently I know in part, 
then moreover I will know as also I have been fully known” (13:12; em-
phasis added). Let us also invoke the original version: Blepomen gar arti di 
esoptrou en anigmati; tote de prosopon pros prosopon; arti ginosko ek merous; 
tote de epignosomai, kathos kai epegnosthen (Bible Hub). Usually quoted as 
the promise of the saints’ participation in divine mysteries (“I will know 
God”), the Pauline confession certainly does preclude another possibility 
involved in that face-to-face encounter, that of an ultimate self-recogni-
tion (“I will know myself ”; “I shall regain my own likeness, disfigured by 
sin”). Whichever interpretation we choose, we cannot miss the fact that 
the contrast between the present opacity and the projected transparency 
of the knowing subject entails a  promise whose fulfilment is rooted in 
God’s antecedent knowledge of a human being (the English “I have been 
known” well renders the Greek epegnosthen), just as our imperfect love 
1 A reader familiar with Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair will imme-
diately recognize the influence of Pauline theology on Kierkegaard’s understanding of sin. 
In The Sickness unto Death the philosopher somewhat misleadingly asserts that Scriptures 
offer no spiritual definition of sin, other than equating it with disobedience; later on he 
provides his own definition which in fact can be very well reconciled with St. Paul’s stance: 
“Sin is: before God in despair not to will to be oneself, or before God in despair to will to 
be oneself ” (66). Both states imply a separation from and disagreement with one’s present 
self, articulated either by a flight away from it, or a desire to achieve it.
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derives from His love, which comes before our love, and our justification 
rests on His antecedent grace. St. Paul’s vision resembles thus both the 
assurance given to the prophet of the Old Testament: “Before I  formed 
you in the womb I knew you” (Jeremiah 1:5), and the soothing awareness 
of the Psalmist who responds with gratitude to God’s continual presence:
You have searched me O Lord, and known me…
Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; I cannot attain unto it.
Whither shall I  go from thy Spirit? Or wither will I  fly from your 
presence? . . .
Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: 
the darkness and the light are both alike to thee. 
(Psalm 139:1–12; emphasis added) 
Moreover, the fulfilment of the promise is guaranteed by God’s infallible 
memory, which makes up for constant human betrayals and inevitable for-
getfulness.2 On the other hand, though, the accomplishment of the ideal is 
postponed until the end of time, so that “now,” in this life, self-recognition 
signifies a partial, intermediate and unstable course of action. Yet again, the 
fact that all the moral, epistemological and ontological possibilities which 
characterize a human being (Kearney 50) ultimately refer to the eschato-
logical possibility of Salvation only enhances their value.
We may now confront St. Paul’s promise with Ricoeur’s illuminat-
ing essay on the winding paths of the human journey of self-discovery. 
His analysis comprises three primary meanings of recognition: (1) simple 
and straightforward identification, (2) recognizing oneself, with recollec-
tion and remembering as instruments of obtaining self-knowledge, and 
(3) mutual recognition that involves not only the struggle between indi-
viduals demanding recognition from their fellow human beings, but also 
signifies bonds of gratitude, mutual acknowledgement and appreciation.3 
Although Ricoeur’s major concern seems to be teasing out the conse-
quences of the Hegelian understanding of the struggle for recognition, all 
three stages of his argument are equally relevant for the reader of Paradise 
2 Memory and promise, as we remember, are two pillars of recognition in Ricoeur’s 
philosophy.
3 All these three aspects play a crucial role in the New Testament account of the 
hour of darkness. First, while saying “I recognize this man,” I mean “This is the man I have 
seen before”; like during Christ’s trial in the high priest’s house the maid recognized Peter 
as one of His disciples: “This man was also with him” (Luke 22:56). Then the bond of 
gratitude, acknowledgement and appreciation is broken by Peter’s denial: “Woman, I know 
him not” (Luke 22:57). Also, Peter obtains self-knowledge only after he wants to conceal 
his true identity (“Man, I am not” [22:59]), precisely when the crow of a cock makes him 
recall Christ’s words: “And Peter remembered the word of the Lord how he had said unto 
him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice” (22:61; emphasis added).
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Lost. In our analysis attention will be most paid to the second chapter 
of his book, devoted mainly to the prospects and pitfalls of recognizing 
oneself. It is there that Ricoeur invokes the Aristotelian concept of an-
agnorismos, which denotes a sudden reversal of fortune, resulting in the 
protagonist’s transition from ignorance to self-knowledge. He illustrates 
his argument with references to the Odyssey and two plays about Oedipus 
(Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus), which anchor the meaning 
of the term in family relations. Accordingly, Ricoeur begins by remind-
ing us that the story of Odysseus’ return focuses mainly on the episodes 
showing how the protagonist step by step reveals his true identity: first to 
his son, then to his wife and his father. An analysis of this literary exam-
ple is the starting point of Ricoeur’s project of the “phenomenology of 
the capable human” (Greisch 94). Since the Homeric message concerning 
the epic hero’s capacity for “recognizing himself as responsible” remains 
limited, as Ricoeur concedes, “to the role that tradition assigns to those 
that stand in the entourage of the master” (Course 77), this one-sided, 
one-way anagnorisis can only be the first step on the way to the concept of 
mutual recognition, and seems to have little bearing on the protagonist’s 
self-recognition. What is more, the course of recognition in Ricoeur’s 
account does develop in a linear succession. The philosopher’s next exam-
ple after Odysseus’ stepping forward is Oedipus’ withdrawal. The title of 
this section reads: “At Colonus, Oedipus retracts.” Yet behind Oedipus’ 
consistent preoccupation with undeserved suffering and “the irresistible 
character of the supernatural forces that govern human destiny,” Ricoeur 
perceives a  dramatic persona who is capable of recognizing himself as 
the “author of the innermost action consisting of his evaluating his acts, 
particularly retrospectively” (Course 77). Even if the gods manipulated 
Oedipus into fratricide and incest, they cannot take over his suffering 
“endured in a responsible manner” (77). Towards the end of this section, 
Ricoeur quotes Bernard Williams, who reminds us that “in the story of 
one’s life there is an authority exercised by what one has done, and not 
merely by what one has intentionally done” (79; emphasis added) and in 
the light of Williams’s observation he calls Oedipus a “suffering human 
being who recognizes himself as agent” (79). Then Ricoeur stresses the 
role of human effective capacities, when he claims that “happiness has its 
source in us, in our activities” and, following on from that, locates “the 
deepest-lying possibility” of self-recognition in its “anchorage in the goal 
of happiness in those activities that make up the human task as such, our 
task” (81). But we should not miss the fact that in the section devoted to 
the “guilty-innocent” Oedipus, the emphasis on human agency which in-
volves a capability to achieve happiness seems overshadowed by the tragic 
hero’s negative capacity for doing wrong, which in turn reminds us of 
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Søren Kierkegaard’s definition of “the human task as such” as being con-
tinually “educated by the possibility” of choosing the wrong path at the 
crossroads of recognition (Hanson).4 
We may indeed claim that Oedipus “retracts” because the tragic hero 
does not plead guilty of crime even when he confesses that he is the very 
man who has committed all the deeds of which he is now accused. At the 
same time, though, Oedipus’ admission that he was “capable” of doing 
what has been done (92), marks an important step forward on the way 
towards self-recognition.5 His discovery also involves the human negative 
propensity for evil, which later will become part-and-parcel of the Chris-
tian project of knowing oneself. But again, this gloomy reminder shows 
only one side of the coin, as indicated in the promise recorded by St. Paul: 
arti ginosko ek merous; tote de epignosomai, kathos kai epegnosthen. Also in 
Ricoeur’s account, potency cannot be separated from limitation and the 
other way round. His “capable man” and fallen/“fallible man” are Siamese 
twins.6 In effect, instead of seeking with Aristotle the moments of recogni-
tion (as fixed points on the axis of narrative time), the French philosopher 
invites his readers to trace the “movements of recognition” (Greisch 95), 
which better correspond with the ebbs and flows of the process of ques-
tioning and recognizing oneself.
Bearing all this in mind, let us see if Ricoeur’s observation can throw 
light on the story of the Fall recounted in John Milton’s poetic theod-
icy, in which the voice of a suffering human can be distinctly heard in 
the poet-narrator’s self-reflexive incursions. The aim of Milton’s epic, 
as we all remember, is not to dwell on “mortal woes,” but “to justify the 
ways of God to man” (I: l. 26).7 If we choose to read the verb “justify” 
in the legal sense (meaning: “to find not guilty”) or even the theologi-
cal one (“to absolve, free from guilt”), we are not far from the risk of 
blasphemy, but Milton’s project consists primarily in understanding the 
4 In his presentation Hanson discussed the reader’s possible responses to the 
story of an Indian ascetic who, after tasting wine, became addicted to drink, included in 
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety. He argued: “The point of such proverbial pieces of partial 
wisdom is that ‘I could just as easily be that fellow.’ But the person educated by possibility 
. . . thinks ‘I am that fellow.’ For the basis on which the student of possibility can be 
absolutely identified with the Indian ascetic is the basis of shared sin-consciousness.”
5 “In an ethical vision not only is it true that freedom is the ground of evil, but the 
avowal of evil is also the condition of the consciousness of evil. For in this avowal one can 
detect the delicate connection of the past and the future, of the self and its acts, of non-
being and pure action in the very core of freedom,” argued Ricoeur in his Preface to Fallible 
Man (xlix).
6 I am alluding here to the title of Ricoeur’s book: Fallible Man.
7 Most future references to Milton’s poem in this essay come from Book IX, 
therefore they will be followed by line number only.
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human predicament which informs the biblical narratives of the Origin 
and the Fall. Viewed in this light, Paradise Lost can be called a “tale of 
recognition,” and should be interpreted as a  paradigmatic example of 
recognition through narration. Moreover, we are invited to read Milton’s 
work not only as an epic story told in verse form, but also as a poem 
in its own right: a hymn of creation, a penitential psalm and a song of 
redemption. The structure of this poem discloses an intricate architec-
tural plan: in Book VI, precisely half way through the text, Raphael gives 
a detailed description of the battle in Heaven and the Fall of Satan, which 
thus becomes the central episode of the story re-told by the poet and the 
axis of symmetry of the entire narration. In Book VII, as if to remind 
the reader of the seven days of creation, Raphael tells Adam how the 
world was created. Earlier, in Book III, one third of the poem’s length, 
the image of the Holy Trinity shines bright: after another Invocation to 
God’s Wisdom identified with the Holy Spirit, the Son offers himself 
a ransom for man and the Father ordains the Incarnation of the Son. The 
Fall of Man is shown in Book IX, two thirds of the poem’s entire length, 
symmetrically corresponding with the preceding promise of Salvation. 
Moreover, unlike the former episodes of Holy History which were me-
diated by angelic messengers who reported to Adam the action that took 
place in Heaven, this time it is Adam and Eve’s turn to become the chief 
actors in the drama of Original Sin. The action of the tragic plot, as 
during a theatrical performance, enfolds on two planes simultaneously, 
while the reader is to recognize himself in the protagonists of the story 
“shown” by the poet, almost as if he was looking into the enchanted mir-
ror of the stage.
In this dramatic re-enactment of the Fall, the Puritan poet follows 
most accurately the account provided in Genesis 3. Beguiled by the ser-
pent’s deceitful eloquence, Milton’s Eve tastes the forbidden fruit, but 
the fatal effects of her deed do not become obvious to her at once. Intoxi-
cated “as with wine,” she sings pagan hymns to the tree, rejoicing in her 
allegedly new, heightened clear-sightedness and expecting to learn even 
more from future experience: 
O sovereign, virtuous, precious of all trees
In Paradise, of operation blest
To sapience, hitherto obscured, infamed . . .
Experience, next to thee I owe, 
Best guide, not following thee I had remained
In ignorance; thou opens wisdom’s way,
And giv’st access, though secret she retire. (ll. 795–97, 807–10) 
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Exactly the same trope of eyes wide open and the broad prospects of 
knowledge and experience recur in Eve’s temptation of Adam, when she 
convinces him that:
This tree is not, as we are told, a tree
Of danger tasted, nor to evil unknown
Opening the way, but of divine effect
To open eyes, and make them gods who taste . . . I
Have also tasted, and have also found
The effects to correspond—opener mine eyes, 
Dim erst, dilated spirits, ampler heart,
And growing up to godhead. (ll. 863–78) 
Adam, at first anxious about the possible misfortune that the breach of 
God’s commandment must bring, unwittingly repeats Eve’s mistake, prais-
ing the delicious “taste of . . . sapience.” However, as the narrator hastens 
to explain, instead of opening the path of wisdom, the eating of the fruit 
displays “far other operation, carnal desire inflaming” (l. 1012). Adam is 
thus at once infected with covetousness, and his wife responds with equal 
intensity “he on Eve / Begun to cast lascivious eyes, she him / As wantonly 
repaid” (ll. 1013–15). They both fall prey to a lusty Cupid (Amor) who as 
if glides between Milton’s lines, leaving but a trace of his invisible presence 
on the level of lexis: “he [Adam] forbore not glance or toy / Of amorous 
intent, well understood / Of Eve, whose eyes darted contagious fires” (ll. 
1034–36; emphasis added).8 Under the cover of the night, the First Parents 
give vent to their lust, sealing their mutual guilt with love sports, “till dewy 
sleep, / Oppressed them, wearied with their amorous play” (ll. 1044–45). 
If we look at this entire episode through the prism of Ricoeur’s philoso-
phy, what we discern in it will probably be less an echo of the unfortunate 
Augustinian identification of Original Sin with carnal lust, than the painful 
birth of the consciousness torn from itself. We may certainly say that at 
this stage of the story Adam and Eve not only desire each other, but also 
desire to be recognized by each other; moreover, they also prove to be 
as yet totally incapable either of self-questioning or of recognizing their 
mutual debts and of expressing gratitude. Most importantly, they are not 
ready as yet to take the leap of faith that would make them accept as their 
own the story of redemption, which Adam has heard from Raphael and 
which now promises to the First Couple another level of existence, despite 
the presently experienced desolation.
8 Interestingly enough, in Book XII, the conventional attributes of Cupid are 
inscribed in Raphael’s prophecy of the Son’s victory “Satan’s assaults” and his “fiery darts.”
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Tired of love (what a  gloomy coda to the promising love scene in 
Eden!), Adam and Eve fall asleep before sunrise, still before sunbeams 
drink up the last drops of morning dew, but their second awakening al-
ready takes place in full light, and gives a completely new sense to their 
previous discoveries:
Soon as the force of that fallacious fruit,
That with exhilarating vapour bland 
About their spirits had played, and inmost powers
Made err, was now exhaled, . . . up they rose
As from unrest, and each the other viewing 
Soon found out their eyes how opened, 
And their minds how darkened. (ll. 1046–54; emphasis added) 
The previous joy of knowing, suggested by Adam and Eve’s frequent rep-
etition of the Latinized form of wisdom—“sapience”—which emphasized 
the seemingly divine provenience and character of their new grasp of real-
ity, now turns out to be mere illusion. Now they see their own guilt re-
flected in each other as in a fatal mirror. And only now can they admit the 
loss caused by the breach, whose immediate consequence is a distorted and 
opaque vision of reality and of themselves. This paradox has been accu-
rately described in André LaCocque’s and Paul Ricoeur’s joint attempt to 
rethink biblical narratives of the Origin and the Fall. LaCocque’s argument 
is worth quoting at length:
It is true than when the humans ate the fruit of knowledge something 
happened that resembles true science: their eyes opened (pqh), a verb 
that is used to describe the opening of the eyes of the blind (Psalm 146:8; 
Isaiah 35:5). But what they saw happens to be only a shameful reality, 
the very contrary of tob of divine proclamation in Genesis 1. . . . The hu-
mans’ vision is a desire to reshape the world; they have an illusory feeling 
that they can do better than the creator. What they obtain is the distortion 
of the given by an interpretation that itself is blurred. . . . Far from master-
ing creation, as the humans thought they would, they are incapable of 
distinguishing what is good for them, their alleged clear-sightedness is 
myopia (or, on another level, nakedness). Blindness is alienation from the 
self as well as from the other, so that they may even entertain an illusion of 
not being seen by anyone else . . ., of being hidden from the eyes of the One 
who surrounds them. (19–20; emphasis added)
It is indeed astonishing how closely this explanation matches Milton’s 
masterly portrayal of Eve’s self-deception when she hopes her deed passed 
unnoticed in heaven. Not only is she deluded in believing that now she can 
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see more, but she also tries to persuade herself that God’s omniscience is 
limited to that of a vigilant mortal tyrant relying on the reports of ubiqui-
tous secret agents:
And I perhaps am secret: heaven is high—
High, and remote to see from thence distinct
Each thing on earth; and other care perhaps
May have diverted from continual watch
Our great forbidder, safe with all his spies
About him. (ll. 811–16; emphasis added)
Adam, far less ingenuously, retires to a  wild thicket (which on the one 
hand reminds us of the romance heroes’ diversion from the path of right-
eousness into the forest of ignorance and, on the other hand, foreshadows 
William Blake’s “forests of the night”) in order to hide there from the 
judicious, “insufferably bright” eye of the sun. His apprehensive question: 
“How shall I behold the face / Henceforth of God or angel, erst with joy 
/ And rapture so oft beheld?” (ll. 1080–81) must wait for the soothing 
answer of the New Testament: “We see indeed presently through a glass in 
obscurity; then moreover face to face.” Until this promise is incarnated in 
the Resurrected Christ, man can only put trust in seclusion. In despair, he 
repeats the mistake of the lyrical I from John Donne’s “Holy Sonnet IX,” 
who did not seek refuge in God’s merciful remembrance, but out of shame 
prayed that the “black memory of his sins” be wiped out by his tears, and 
he himself be forgotten by God, rather than granted forgiveness (“That 
Thou remember them, some claim as debt; / I think it mercy if Thou wilt 
forget”). Milton’s Adam expresses a similar desire:
O might I here
In solitude live savage, in some glade
Obscured, where highest woods, impenetrable
To star or sunlight, spread their umbrage broad
And brown as evening, cover me, you pines;
Ye cedars, with innumerable boughs 
Hide me, where I may never see them more. (ll. 1084–90)
This statement is, of course, miles and miles away from the self-con-
sciousness of a capable human being. The irony involved in Milton’s pres-
entation of the protagonists’ self-recognition consists in the fact that upon 
eating the fatal fruit the humans indeed become “hidden,” “concealed” 
creatures, as each sinner is a “secret” to him/herself, even though they still 
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remain perfectly transparent, fully “known” to the Maker. Paradoxically 
enough, Adam’s despair is the most obvious evidence of his error: over-
come by sin, he does not wish any longer to be seen/ known or remembered 
by God, nor to see, know or remember Him looking at the sky. Man’s first 
clothes to cover his shameful nakedness are not made of fig leaves, but 
woven of the immaterial fabric of ominous shadows (“umbrage”), dark-
ness, gloom. The moment of the sinners’ most acute self-awareness is in 
fact tantamount to the loss of the self. Moreover, no matter whether we 
attribute this loss to the characters’ self-ignorance or self-deceit, there can 
be little doubt that the damage cannot be mended immediately. As Claudia 
Welz reminds us:
One can attribute self-deception to oneself only in retrospect. The gram-
mar of self-deception entails Nachträglichkeit. It does not make sense 
to say, “I am deceiving myself,” but it makes perfect sense to discover 
after the fact, “I deceived myself at that time.” Realizing self-deception 
requires a temporal caesura and a new, revised, self-evaluation. (159; em-
phasis added)
On the other hand, Milton’s Adam is at least partially right when he intuits 
the importance of memory’s opposite, forgetting, in the complex process 
of self-recognition. In this way, the fall of Milton’s protagonist into time 
and history marks the beginning of Adam’s course of recognition. This is 
in perfect agreement concerning what contemporary theory tells us about 
the connection between recognition and time:
Forgetting is the other side of recognition, but also its prerequisite, 
whereas both concepts are necessary to the understanding of oneself 
and of the past, but also of the present and future alike, and thus acquire 
a dimension that is truly historical. (Le Huenen x)
This must be the reason why in trying to heighten the paradox of eyes 
“wide shut” by sin, Milton’s grand epic puts such an emphasis on the pat-
terns of memory, forgetting, recollection and repetition. The consecutive 
episodes of Adam and Eve’s falling asleep and waking up, which set the 
pace of their story in the wonderful garden, can thus be read as metaphors 
of the moments of oblivion and remembering. We should not forget in 
this context that the Aristotelian anagnorisis, akin to un-forgetting: an-
amnesis, is itself a turning point, a moment of reversal and sudden change 
of fortune. As Rachel Adelman reminds us: “Both the Greek term anag-
norisis and the English re-cognition, suggest a re-turn in thought, a ‘go-
ing back’ . . ., perceiving the past anew through the prism of the  present 
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truth” (53). On the surface level, Eve’s speech immediately following 
the plucking of the fruit fulfils this requirement, by re-evaluating past 
 ignorance and innocence from the standpoint of the newly acquired and, 
apparently still exhilarating experience and knowledge of things “hitherto 
obscured, infamed,” echoed in Adam’s complaint: “Much pleasure we 
have lost, while we abstained / From this delightful fruit, nor known till 
now/ True relish” (ll. 1022–24). Yet, in fact, in the course of time whose 
trajectory—as Ricoeur constantly repeats—determines the curving paths 
of human recognition, both the protagonists of the poem and Milton’s 
readers are soon forced to revise their opinions in order to recognize their 
own error of judgment. Only then can we undertake the exercise set out 
by the poet, that of anamnesis, un-forgetting the forlorn happiness that 
should ultimately result in anagnorisis: the recovered, regained picture of 
ransomed Man, imprinted in the history of Redemption. (There is moreo-
ver a basic difference between the Platonic anamnesis, which only allows 
a hindsight of perfect knowledge, and the Christian project of un-forget-
ting the divine image, as outlined by St. Paul, which opens the prospect 
of the future, perfect mutual recognition: I will know as also I have been 
fully known.9) First, however, the humans must be reminded of the pre-
history, proto-history of the Fall. For Paradise Lost not only opens an 
enticing perspective of un-forgetting Paradise, but, perhaps even more 
importantly, imposes on the reader an obligation to return to the “time of 
origins,” and retrieve from thence the painful, but necessary memory of 
Original Sin.
Here again, Ricoeur offers help to Milton’s readers, this time with 
postulating a model of biblical hermeneutics which, on the one hand, takes 
into account “the caesura between primordial and historical time,” which 
denotes “more than discontinuity” and implies that “the time of primor-
dial events in relation to the time of those in history cannot be fully coor-
dinated in terms of some temporal succession” (“Thinking Creation” 32). 
On the other hand, however, the French philosopher lays emphasis on the 
umbilical cord that links the biblical myths of the Origin and the Fall with 
its actual development in the body of historical time. Ricoeur says: “the 
Creation arises out of prehistory whose reported events set into movement 
a broad dynamism operating at the very heart of history” (32). In other 
words, “the events that occurred in the time of origins have an inaugural 
value as regards the history that, on the literary plane of  narration, follows 
9 This Christian understanding of anamnesis is in line with Professor Boitani’s 
suggestion that the Greek prefix ana- involves not only a mere coming back to the point 
of departure, but also suggests a movement upwards: ana-gnorisis is then a “spot of time,” 
to use Wordsworth’s apt metaphor, when the human being, struck by surprise and wonder, 
advances and rises in the knowledge of himself. (qtd. in Russo xiv)
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the primordial events” (33). They are “seeds of time,” to use a Shakespear-
ean phrase, in which the history of Salvation germinates. Needless to say, 
the action of Milton’s poem embraces both times, beginning with the crea-
tive speech act of Eternal Logos, to the historical events of Christ’s birth 
and the death of the Word Incarnate on Golgotha.10
At the beginning of Book IX Milton puts stress on the insurmount-
able barrier separating the bucolic past (“rural repast . . . / venial discourse 
unblamed” [ll. 4–5]) from the tragic present (“foul distrust, and breach / 
disloyal” [ll. 5–6]), and emphasizes the distance that after the Fall sepa-
rates Man from God (“on the part of Heaven/ Now alienated, distance 
and distaste” [ll. 8–9]) and heaven from earth. Critics argue as to whether 
Milton’s epic should be read in accordance with the rules of psychological 
realism framed by the narrative coherence of the story (which would stress 
linear progress from innocence, through temptation and self-temptation 
to the Fall), or whether the account of Original Sin should take the reader 
by surprise, suggesting the complete disjunction between the primordial 
innocence and the post-lapsarian despair.11 Of course, narrative—“in the 
strong sense of this term,” as Ricoeur would add—always implies causal 
sequencing, but one cannot fail to notice that Milton’s extensive use of 
prolepsis and analepsis, alongside his masterpiece engrafting various lite-
rary genres onto the epic texture of his poem, from pastoral tale to tragedy 
(Kiefer Lewalski),12 allows one to perceive in the poet’s account both the 
progression of events on the horizontal plane and a  sudden leap on the 
vertical axis, which certainly involves more than mere reversal of fortune. 
Even the poet’s enjambments, which, in the Invocation to Book IX, break 
up nominal phrases, rather than “striding over” the lines in order to create 
the impression of a seamless flow of the narrative, enhance the sense of 
a sudden disconnectedness and dislocation.
Ricoeur’s biblical hermeneutics provides a modern reader with inter-
pretative tools which help us better comprehend this double-fold design of 
Milton’s epic. In order to account for the complex structure of the Book 
10 Ricoeur’s argument about the connection between the “time of origins” and the 
historical time (which is also the time of fulfilment), so prominent in the philosopher’s 
interpretation to Genesis 1, follows the medieval and Renaissance tradition of placing 
Paradise and the Tree of Knowledge exactly in the same place where the cross stood on 
Golgotha (“Thinking Creation” 30–67).
11 The best known proponent of the theory of radical discontinuity in Milton’s poem 
was Stanley Fish (1988). The same line of argument informs John S. Tanner’s Kierkegaardian 
reading of Paradise Lost. For the “psychological” readings of the First Parent’s motivation 
cf. for instance John Steadman (1968). 
12 Ricoeur’s reference to Pierre Gibert’s remark that “no privileged literary form 
captures Creation” (36) seems to accord with the diversity of genres employed in Milton’s 
rendering of Genesis 1–3. 
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of Genesis, the philosopher recalls Claus Westermann’s concept of Ge-
schehenbogen (a “narrative arch”), which allows him to avoid the mistake of 
speaking about two states of humanity separated by a fault, and instead fa-
cilitates our understanding of the unity (not just tropological foreshadow-
ing) of “one complex, integral event” that includes both “the prohibition, 
the temptation, the transgression and the trial” of Genesis 3, as well as “the 
histories of disobedience attributed to Israel or other nations” (“Thinking 
Creation” 42).13 Following on from that, Ricoeur postulates “progression 
in the separation, within the single primordial history, that culminates in 
the impoverished condition represented by the expulsion from the gar-
den” (42; emphasis added). Paradoxically enough, this perspective allows 
him to reach the bright side of separation: not endowed with the negative 
meaning of “dereliction or alienation” (38), but interpreted as a  benign 
withdrawal of God which gives the humans “access to responsibility as 
regards oneself and others” (39; emphasis added). This, in turn, renders the 
human agent morally accountable for his or her actions (both the ones 
 s/he committed and those s/he only could have committed), but perhaps 
even more importantly it also opens a space of dialogue within oneself 
and with the other/Other.14 
Although Ricoeur does not say it explicitly, I think we are entitled to 
add that the most accomplished form of that dialogue would be a prayer of 
praise, understood as human response to the call from the divine and dis-
tant, but not altogether absent Other, in recognition of the fact that “the 
human task as such” starts with the unconditional, divine gift of “having 
been known” by the Father. After all, even Milton’s Adam, after his first 
fatal misrecognition (when he assumes that he is a god) and his second, 
incomplete anagnorisis (when driven by despair he does not want to be 
seen by God and deems himself as good as dead), learns step by step that 
“guilty and punished, humanity is not cursed,” (Ricoeur, “Thinking Crea-
tion” 39) and that east of Eden man can also thank for the mercy of God. 
The best example of such a prayer of gratitude is the already quoted Psalm, 
13 The readers of Paradise Lost are immediately reminded in this context of the 
historical coda in Milton’s great epic, where the Puritan poet recounts the blameless origins 
of the Catholic Church and its subsequent corruption, putting in the mouth of Michael the 
following prophecy: “Then they shall seek to avail themselves of names / Places and titles, 
and with these to join / Secular power, though feigning still to act / By spiritual” (XII: ll. 
515–18). 
14 Ricoeur says: “We must be very attentive to the composition of the narrative 
configuration [of Genesis 3] if we are correctly to designate what counts as the primordial 
history. It would be an error and a grave mistake for the theological comprehension of this 
whole sequence to consider the transgression as separating two successive ‘states,’ a  state of 
innocence that alone would be primordial and a fallen state, which would henceforth be part of 
history” (“Thinking Creation” 42; emphasis added).
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surely deserving to be called a song of recognition: “I will praise thee; for 
I am fearfully and wonderfully made: marvelous are thy works; and that 
my soul knoweth right well” (Psalm 139:14). Moreover, as both Milton 
and Ricoeur show us, it is memory enhanced by narration which provides 
us with an indispensable tool for carrying on the task of recognizing our 
true selves. Although not free of the risk of self-delusion, in the ultimate 
perspective this most important human venture has been blessed with the 
promise of knowing truly and seeing face to face the “something secret,” 
“something divine,” which despite the Fall dwells within ourselves.
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